Abstract: In this study, we investigate the timing of bank regulatory report releases and their role in banks' information environments. Each quarter commercial banks and bank holding companies file detailed financial reports called Call Reports and FR Y-9Cs with bank regulators. We find that Call Reports, but not FR Y-9Cs, elicit economically significant stock price and volume reactions when they are publicly released, even when the Call Report follows an earnings announcement. Our results also indicate that the release of the Call Reports is tightly clustered around the 30th day after quarter end. A historical record of the public release dates of these regulatory reports is not available; we collected these dates for nine quarters and, using these data, we provide evidence that researchers may use an assumed day 30 release date to obtain results about market reaction that are similar to those obtained using the actual release date of the Call Report. Finally, we show that since bank regulators undertook a "modernization project" to speed the processing and public dissemination of regulatory reports, the banking industry routinely experiences abnormal stock price volatility and trading volume on the 30th day of the quarter. Our findings indicate that investors derive incremental information from regulatory filings, and they highlight a marketmoving information event about banks that occurs in a tight window around the 30th day of the quarter.
I. INTRODUCTION
Each quarter commercial banks and bank holding companies (BHCs) file detailed financial reports called Call Reports (i.e., Reports of Condition and Income) and FR Y-9Cs with bank regulators. The reports are publicly accessible online or through subscription data providers such as SNL Financial, and are released in the same general time frame as earnings announcements and 10-K or 10-Q filings. Call Reports present information at the individual bank level, and thus are filed by each individual bank within a BHC or by independent banks (that are not part of BHCs). Y-9Cs present information consolidated at the BHC level, and are thus filed only by BHCs. The two types of reports have similar organization and reportable items. The information in the reports includes an income statement and balance sheet, and considerably overlaps with the information in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 10-K/Q forms.
1 Compared to 10-K/Qs, the bank regulatory reports tend to contain finer subcategories of financial statement items and additional details about mortgage lending activities, regulatory capital, and credit risk, all presented in standardized schedules. Unlike 10-K/Qs, the regulatory reports contain almost no qualitative disclosures. In this study, we investigate the timing of the regulatory report releases and their role in banks' information environments.
A historical record of the public release dates is not publicly available, and a Freedom of Information Act request for the release dates was denied. We instead obtained release dates by tracking the release of each report in real time from January 1, 2012 to March 31, 2014 through SNL Financial, which scans the regulatory reporting websites multiple times per day and provided 1 The recognition and measurement practices followed in creating the regulatory reports conform to U.S. GAAP, although the reports provide information that goes beyond what is required by U.S. GAAP. Because Call Reports are bank-level reports, each bank (along with its consolidated subsidiaries) is considered an accounting entity (FDIC 2012, 11) .
us with a daily listing of the reports that had become available for download. 2 During this period, we find that most Call Reports become public on the 30th calendar day following quarter end, or on the next business day if the 30 th calendar day falls on a weekend or holiday. The regulatory reports are released in the same general time frame as earnings announcements and 10-K/Q filings, giving rise to questions about their role in banks' information environments. We examine whether BHC stock prices respond to the release of the reports, whether the response depends on the timing of the reports relative to earnings announcements and 10-K/Q filings, and whether the response to earnings announcements is lower when they follow the regulatory reports. Call Reports are usually issued after earnings announcements. Y-9Cs are almost always issued after Call Reports and earnings announcements and are sometimes issued after 10-K/Qs. Thus, earnings announcements could preempt information in Call Reports, and earnings 2 Gathering these dates in real time was necessary because SNL Financial overwrites its record of original release dates when the bank amends a filing. Filings are amended often but the changes tend to be small (as discussed in the Results section). 3 For ease of exposition, we refer to "day 30" as the 30 th calendar day following quarter end, or as the next business day if the 30 th calendar day falls on a weekend or holiday. 4 Banks are required to state the regulatory reports on a calendar year basis even if their GAAP fiscal years do not follow calendar years. Nearly all banks have GAAP fiscal years that conform to calendar years, however.
announcements, Call Reports, and 10-K/Qs could preempt information in Y-9Cs. Conversely, in the minority of cases when Call Reports precede earnings announcements, Call Reports could preempt information in earnings announcements (although, unlike earnings announcements, Call Reports do not provide consolidated earnings for a BHC nor qualitative disclosures). In addition to examining how these sequencing differences affect market reactions, we also examine whether the reaction to the regulatory reports varies with bank characteristics, such as size and risk, which are hypothesized to make the reports more or less informative to investors.
We find that Call Reports elicit statistically significant stock price and volume reactions when they are publicly released. The market reaction is statistically significant even when the Call Report follows an earnings announcement (which is the most common scenario). To proxy for price reaction we compute a measure of price volatility that sums the squared market-adjusted returns on the report release day and the following day (event days 0 and +1). Our abnormal volume metric is also measured over the same two-day window. When the Call Report follows (precedes) the earnings announcement, mean price volatility around the report release date is 19 (12) percent higher than the non-event day mean. Although both means are statistically significantly greater than the non-event day mean, they do not statistically differ from each other.
In contrast, price volatility around earnings announcements statistically differs according to whether the earnings announcement follows or precedes the Call Report; mean price volatility around earnings announcements that follow (precede) Call Reports is 131 (192) percent higher than the non-event day mean. Thus, when one report arrives before the other, Call Reports tend to preempt information in earnings announcements, but evidence is inconclusive about whether earnings announcements preempt information in Call Reports. Call Report releases are also associated with high trading volume, although results tend to be statistically weaker. We find no statistically significant price or volume reaction to releases of Y-9C reports. The most plausible explanation is that Y-9Cs are released late in the reporting season, after their information content has been preempted by Call Reports, earnings announcements, and sometimes 10-K/Qs.
We next investigate whether the market reaction to Call Reports varies with bank characteristics. We focus on Call Reports released after earnings announcements because this is the most common sequence and results may speak to why investors find the Call Report useful after they have seen the earnings announcement. We find that market reaction to Call Reports decreases in bank size, consistent with large banks having stronger information environments that make Call Reports less relevant. We do not find evidence that the market reaction to Call Reports varies with the bank's capital ratio, asset/liability maturity gap, use of derivatives, reporting complexity, or detail in the announcement of earnings.
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Given that the exact dates of Call Report releases are not available outside of our handcollected sample period, we assess how well the market reaction to Call Report releases can be approximated by assuming that all Call Reports are released on day 30 (or on the next business day if day 30 falls on weekends or holidays). Within our sample period, we find that the results based on the assumed "day 30" release dates are similar to those based on actual release dates. When the earnings announcement precedes day 30, mean price volatility around day 30 is 24 percent higher than the non-event day mean. The magnitude of the effect and the t-statistic are similar to that obtained using actual release dates. The magnitudes of the two effects do not differ statistically from each other. When the earnings announcement follows day 30, the mean price volatility around day 30 is 9 percent higher than the non-event day mean. The magnitude of the effect is 5 The market reaction to Call Reports decreases in the use of derivatives, the number of Y-9C cells containing non-zero values, and the level of detail in the earnings announcement. However, these proxies are highly correlated with bank size, which in turn is negatively correlated with the market reaction to Call Reports. When controlling for bank size, the explanatory power of these variables becomes statistically insignificant. similar to that obtained using actual release dates, but the t-statistic of 0.61 is markedly lower than the t-statistic of 1.74 obtained using actual release dates. Thus, for the price volatility measure of market reaction, results using assumed day 30 release dates are similar to those using actual release dates, provided that earnings are announced before day 30. Similar patterns hold for the volumebased measure of market reaction.
In late 2005, bank regulators completed a "modernization project" to speed the processing and public dissemination of regulatory reports (Gruenberg 2006; FFIEC 2006, 5) . We find a pattern of market responses to Call Reports that is consistent with the timing of the modernization project. Using assumed day 30 release dates, we extend the sample period back to the year 2000 and partition by year to determine when day 30 became a market-moving event day in the banking industry. We find that five of the eight years between 2006 and 2013 exhibit higher price volatility and/or trading volume around day 30. In contrast, none of the six years between 2000 and 2005 exhibit higher price volatility or trading volume around day 30.
The findings have several implications for practice and regulation. First, the findings increase awareness that a flood of market-moving information about banks is routinely released in a tight window around the 30 th day of every quarter, a fact that has not been well publicized nor empirically examined. For some banks this information release precedes and preempts the earnings announcement. Second, the finding that bank stock prices respond to information that is required by bank regulators provides evidence supporting the proposition that bank regulators can use equity market values as signals in their supervisory processes (Furlong and Williams 2006; Curry et al. 2003) . Third, the findings are suggestive of a positive externality related to the costly regulatory reporting process; even after earnings are released, investors react to Call Report releases. The reaction suggests that the reports have immediate incremental information content, unlike 10-K and 10-Q filings which tend not to elicit immediate market reaction (as found in this and other studies discussed later).
The implications of the findings for academic research are as follows. It appears that researchers can conduct studies involving market reactions to bank regulatory filings despite not knowing the exact release dates. Our timing analysis shows that day 30 is an accurate assumption for 56 percent of Call Report releases, and an event window spanning days 27 to 31 captures 92 percent of releases. Furthermore, within our sample period, when blindly applying the day 30 assumption, mean price volatility and volume are similar to those observed using the actual Call
Report release dates (provided that earnings announcements have already occurred). We also find that Y-9C filings are less clustered in time compared to Call Reports and elicit no statistically significant market reaction. Thus, for studies involving market valuation of regulatory reporting items, the most powerful designs likely are achieved by focusing on Call Report filings around day 30 rather than on the less clustered and less timely Y-9C filings. Finally, the results are relevant to market studies that do not directly focus on bank regulatory reporting. In market studies involving samples that include banks, research designs should take into account banks' abnormal market activity around day 30 and the potential preemption of earnings announcements or other disclosures that follow day 30.
II. MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
The banking industry plays a crucial role in the economy through financial intermediation between capital providers (e.g. depositors) and borrowers. Bank equity serves as a buffer to shield capital providers, or government insurers of capital providers, from losses. The market valuation of this buffer may serve as a useful supervisory signal to regulators because it aggregates market participants' judgments about bank risk (Furlong and Williams 2006; Curry et al. 2003) . Although the interests of equity holders do not perfectly align with those of bank regulators, Furlong and Williams (2006, 20) conclude that stock prices signal relevant aspects of risk to regulators, and point out that it may be more practical for regulators to rely on stock prices than debt prices because stocks tend to trade in more liquid markets. Recently, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) stated that "a review of market indicators in the lead up to the recent financial crisis reveals that market-based data often provided an early signal of deterioration in a company's financial condition" (FRB 2012, 640) . Moreover, to implement Section 166(c)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the FRB proposes using several equity-and debt-based market indicators, including a version of the market-to-book ratio, as "remediation triggers" for heightened supervisory review as soon as numeric thresholds are breached. The effectiveness of these market-based indicators depends, in part, on the ability of market values to promptly impound information from regulatory reports.
In addition to playing an informational role, equity claims can aid in bank regulation by serving as a source of market discipline. Equity holders can perform governance and monitoring that complements bank regulation and helps compensate for the lax monitoring of insured depositors (FRB 2000, 2; Furlong and Williams 2006, 20; Beatty and Liao 2013, 9-11) . The sensitivity of the market value of equity to the release of regulatory reports indicates how closely equity holders are monitoring bank regulatory information and whether the regulatory reports provide relevant information to them.
Understanding the use of bank regulatory reports in equity markets is also important because of the costs of preparing and distributing the reports. An interagency body called the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) expends public resources to maintain the report distribution website and to validate and publicly release each report as fast as within one day of receipt (FFIEC 2006, 6 Easton and Zmijweski (1993) conduct the largest-sample study of the pre-EDGAR period and find a statistically significant market reaction only when the 10-K/Q is the only release of financial results for the period. 6 In these cases, the 10-K/Q is the de facto earnings release.
A similar pattern has persisted during the period of electronic filing on EDGAR. While some studies of the EDGAR period find a statistically significant market reaction on 10-K/10-Q filing dates (Asthana and Balsam 2002; Griffin 2003; You and Zhang 2009), Li and Ramesh (2009) point out that the studies do not consider the role of concurrent news about earnings. After eliminating cases when the 10-K/Qs serve as the de facto earnings release, or when an earnings announcement is concurrently issued with a 10-K/Q, Li and Ramesh (2009) find no reliable reaction to 10-Qs and find that reaction to 10-Ks is concentrated in the relatively small number of 10-Ks filed around calendar quarter ends. The authors attribute the quarter-end reaction to increased market attention and information transfer across firms at calendar quarter ends. Our study 6 Other studies of the pre-EDGAR period include Foster and Vickrey (1978) , Foster et al. (1983) , Cready and Mynatt (1991), and Stice (1991) . In general, these studies find little market reaction to 10-K filings.
examines whether the market reacts to a financial statement report that is similar to the 10-K/Q except that it has a standardized format, has more detailed quantitative disclosures, and has considerably fewer qualitative disclosures. Thus, the study improves understanding of circumstances under which financial information beyond that provided in earnings announcements has information content.
Institutional Background
Federally supervised commercial banks and bank holding companies must file financial Regulatory agencies do not make public a record of the original submission or release dates.
The fields on the two report types that denote the date and time of submission are designated as confidential and are withheld from the public. 10 For both report types, a "last update" date is publicly observable on the front page the reports. However, this date is overwritten whenever the report is amended, and FDIC staff indicated that amendments are made frequently. In our sample, 36.7 percent of the reports are amended within the first 3 months, and our review in 2014 of ten 9 The chief financial officer (CFO) must sign a declaration on the cover page attesting to the correctness of the Call Report and Y-9C. In addition, attestation must be made by at least three (two) directors of the reporting bank, other than the CFO, for all national, state member banks, and savings associations (state nonmember banks). 10 The Call Report fields are RSSD8798 and RSSD8799. The Y-9C fields are BHCKF841 and BHCKF842.
Call Reports and ten Y-9Cs filed in 2008 and 2009 found that six (ten) Call Reports (Y-9Cs) had "last update" dates after the legal filing deadline, indicating that the original date had been overwritten. Consequently, studies that seek to examine the market reaction to these reports should not rely upon the report date on the front page of the reports.
Banks expend significant resources on regulatory reporting, incremental to the resources expended in GAAP reporting, as illustrated by the following comment letter excerpt from bank industry lobby groups:
"In anticipation of meeting the LBP [Large Bank Pricing] rule's requirements for fourth quarter 2011 (and beyond), LBP banks have and continue to work hard to develop systems and to educate personnel to capture the data required. In doing so, it has become clear that there continue to be real practical barriers to capturing and reporting data consistently, even prospectively. The banks have found that automated solutions are not available and cannot be easily created to capture information. As a consequence, they have had to look to manual methods for data capture, which is very costly and time consuming, and involves considerable training for thousands of employees" (ABA et al. 2011, 2) .
Regulators themselves also expend resources in validating the reports and posting online. Between the banks and the regulators, the reports are checked against approximately 2,000 validation criteria (Gruenberg 2006) . Investment in a "modernization" project in 2005 allowed regulators to begin taking delivery of the reports on the day after quarter end (compared to weeks after) and allowed the reports to be publicly released within a day of receipt (compared to several days after) (FFIEC 2006, 6) .
Differences between bank regulatory reports and 10-K/Qs
There is much redundancy across bank regulatory reports and 10-K/Qs. We compared the bank regulatory reports to a 10-K/Q of five banks of varying sizes, and noted four major areas where the bank regulatory reports tended to provide more information than did the 10-K/Qs. information, and internal control deficiencies. In summary, there is substantial overlap across bank regulatory reports and 10-K/Qs, but each type of report contains some unique information.
III. SAMPLE SELECTION
We restrict the sample to publicly traded BHCs that file a Y-9C report and also own a commercial bank that files a Call Report, excluding eight publicly traded commercial banks that are not held by BHCs. In order to link the BHCs to commercial banks, we use the Summary of Deposits file from the FDIC website (http://www2.fdic.gov/SOD/dynaDownload.asp?barItem=6).
We identify the public release dates of the Call Reports and Y-9Cs from January which the first Call Report is released, we make the design choice in all analyses to include only the first Call Report filing day for a given BHC in each quarter. Reports. Both panels continue to show that Y-9C releases generally do not begin until after earnings announcements and Call Report releases end. Releases of fourth-quarter Y-9Cs tend to occur between days +4 and +13, sharply peak at day +12, and tend to precede 10-K filings.
Timing of the Reports
Releases of interim Y-9Cs are not as clustered. They tend to occur between days +1 and +11, peak at day +9 and are released in roughly the same time frame as 10-Qs. 14 To summarize the sequencing of the reports, earnings announcements usually arrive first and Call Reports usually arrive second, although in a minority of cases Call Reports arrive first. Y-9Cs and 10-K/Qs arrive later. In the fourth quarter, Y-9Cs tend to arrive before 10-Ks, while in interim quarters the two reports are released in roughly the same time frame. Finally, Panel C provides an example of a bank that files its Call Report before the earnings announcement. Old National Bancorp's Call Report is released 29 days after quarter end followed by the earnings announcement 5 days later. Approximately 10 percent of the bank-quarters in our 14 Because we tailor the day numbering scheme to the Call Report due date, the figures slightly understate the degree of Y-9C clustering. This occurs because the number of trading days between day 0 and the due date of the Y-9C varies across quarters. For example, in one quarter the Y-9C due date might fall on day +7 but in another quarter it might fall on day +8.
sample are cases like this in which the bank files the Call Report before the earnings announcement.
All are cases in which the banks later issue a press release to announce earnings, as opposed to cases in which banks never issue a press release and simply file a 10-Q. On average, the Call Report precedes the earnings press release by five days. These banks tend to be smaller (median assets of $1.0 billion versus $2.1 billion for the full sample) and 36 percent have analyst following.
Approximately 49% of these banks repeat the pattern of filing the Call Report before the earnings announcement in other quarters. Banks that file a Call Report before an earnings announcement in at least one quarter do so an average of two times over our nine sample quarters.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN Price Volatility and Trading Volume around Public Release Dates
We use the following specification to test for abnormal price volatility or trading volume around the public release dates of earnings announcements, Call Reports, Y-9Cs, and 10-K/Qs:
Price Volatility or Volume metricit = α + β1EAit + β2CALLit + β3Y9Cit + β410KQit + εit
for all i banks and t trading days. We estimate the model parameters using the trading days in the three months following quarter end.
The price volatility metric is computed as follows:
where is bank i's market-adjusted stock return on day t. The numerator is the cumulative squared market-adjusted return over days t and t+1. The denominator is the mean of this quantity measured during the last month of the previous quarter, which controls for the bank's normal level of price volatility near the time of the event dates. We use the last month of the previous quarter as a baseline for a bank's price volatility because this month tends not to have filing events. Using squared returns eliminates the need to specify an expectations model for the direction in which the market will respond to a filing. We include the squared return on day t+1 to accommodate reports that are filed after market hours, and to allow time for market participants to process the information in the filings.
Following Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006) , the volume metric is computed as follows:
where Vit (VMt) is bank i's (CRSP universe) trading volume on day t, and Shsit (ShsMt) is bank i's (CRSP universe) shares outstanding on day t. The first part of the metric sums bank i's share turnover (Vit / Shsit) over days t and t+1, and adjusts the bank's share turnover for the share turnover of the market on those same days. The second part of the metric adjusts this marketadjusted turnover metric for the bank's average level of market-adjusted turnover during the last month of the previous quarter. Subtracting the second part helps control for liquidity driven trading that is unrelated to the information events (Garfinkel and Sokobin 2006) . We subtract the second part of the metric from the first part, rather than divide, because each part can have negative values.
The VOL (RET) metric is sensitive to cases when there is disagreement (consensus) among investors about how the information in a filing affects firm value (Beaver 1968 ). While we expect results to be similar across the two metrics, we use both metrics in case reaction to bank regulatory filings tends to be dominated by either disagreement or consensus.
The EAit, CALLit, Y9Cit, and 10KQit explanatory variables are (1, 0) indicators denoting whether an earnings announcement, Call Report, Y-9C report, or 10-K/Q is filed by firm i on day t.
As explained in the sample selection section, we remove a bank's day t from the sample if two or more filings occur on days t-1 to t+1. Thus, the two-day RET and VOL metrics for a given filing event are unlikely to reflect market reaction to the other filings.
Next we augment regression (1) to determine whether the price or volume reaction depends on the sequencing of the reports. We focus on the sequencing of the earnings announcement and the Call Report because they are almost always the first two reports in the sequence, and because no evidence of reaction to Y-9Cs and 10-K/Qs is found when estimating regression (1). The specification is as follows:
Price Volatility or Volume metricit = α + β1EA1it + β2EA2it + β3CALL1it + β4CALL2it
The suffix of 1 or 2 on the EA and CALL variables denotes whether the report was filed first or second. EA1 (EA2) is an indicator variable for earnings announcement days that precede (follow)
Call Report filing days. CALL1 (CALL2) is an indicator variable for Call Report filing days that precede (follow) earnings announcement days. β1 > β2 and β3 > β4 provides evidence that earlier filings preempt later filings due to redundancy of information.
Market Reactions and Bank Characteristics
Next we examine whether the market reactions to the filings vary cross-sectionally with bank characteristics. We continue to hold the sequencing of the filings constant as in regression (4), and interact EA1, EA2, CALL1, and CALL2 with variables that proxy for bank characteristics:
Price Volatility or Volume metric = α + β1EA1 + β2EA2 + β3CALL1 + β4CALL2 + β5Z + β6EA1*Z + β7EA2*Z + β8CALL1*Z + β9CALL2*Z + β10Y9C + β1110KQ + ε
where Z is the bank characteristic (bank and time subscripts are dropped to ease readability). The bank characteristics we examine are size, capital ratio, asset-liability maturity gap, and two proxies for complexity: use of derivatives and the number of Y-9C cells containing non-zero values. We also examine the number of words in the earnings announcement, which proxies for the level of detail in the earnings announcement (see Appendix for variable definitions). 
Day 30 as a Proxy for the Call Report Filing Date
The fact that Call Report releases are clustered in a tight window around the 30 th day of the quarter creates the possibility that researchers can conduct powerful tests of market reactions to Call
Reports without having access to the exact release dates. We next investigate how closely the market reaction to Call Report releases can be approximated by assuming that all Call Reports are released on "day 30." We replace the CALL1 and CALL2 variables in regression (4) Price Volatility or Volume metricit = α + β1EAit + β2A_CALLit + β3A_Y9Cit + β410KQit + εit (7) We also replace the Y9C indicator with an assumed Y-9C indicator (denoted A_Y9C) that equals 1 on day 45 (40) following fourth (interim) quarter ends. We expect that the estimated coefficient on A_CALL will be consistently positive and statistically significant over 2006 to 2013. Such a pattern in the coefficients would be consistent with abnormal market activity on day 30 beginning to occur after banking regulators completed the modernization project to streamline the processing and dissemination of regulatory reports. In Panel B we examine the market reaction to the 761 amended Call Reports that do not coincide with an earnings announcement, Y9C, and/or 10-K/Q release. There is no evidence of price or volume reactions to the amendments, which is consistent with the small effects on assets and capital ratios observed in Panel A. Taken together the results from Table 2 indicate that a significant number of Call Reports are amended, but the amendments tend to be immaterial as evidenced by the errors' small mean size and lack of market reaction. Due to the significant number of amendments to Call Reports, the "last update" date for Call Reports that is available in public research databases is not a reliable record of original Call Report release dates.
V. RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics for Test Variables
[Insert Table 2 here] We next examine reactions around Call Report filing dates (labeled CALL). We find higher mean and median RET and VOL on Call Report filing days relative to non-event days (p < .01).
Univariate Tests of Market Reaction
Mean (median) RET on Call Report filing days is 18 (25) percent higher than on non-event days.
These results are consistent with Call Reports informing the market. Mean and median RET are statistically significantly higher on Call Report event days regardless of whether the Call Report precedes or follows the earnings announcement (labeled CALL1 and CALL2). Mean and median VOL are statistically significantly higher only when the Call Report follows the earnings announcement. The evidence suggests that, despite the prior release of earnings, the market finds the Call Report to be informative.
Finally, we evaluate market reaction to Y-9Cs and the 10-K/Qs. There is no evidence of higher price volatility or volume on Y-9C or 10-K/Q event days, nor does the volatility or volume appear to vary with the sequencing of the Y-9C filing relative to the 10-K/Q filing. In fact, mean and median VOL tend to be statistically significantly lower on Y-9C and 10-K/Q event days.
Taken together, the results indicate that the equity market finds earnings announcements and the Call Reports immediately informative, but not Y-9Cs and 10-K/Qs.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Regression-based Tests of Market Reaction
We use regression to examine: (1) whether the equity market responds to the release of the Call Report and the Y9C; (2) whether the market response depends on the timing of the regulatory reports relative to earnings announcements; (3) whether the timing of the regulatory reports affects responses to earnings announcements; and, (4) whether market reaction varies with bank characteristics. The regression framework allows us to cluster standard errors by day to account for the fact that many of the event dates occur on the same day across banks. Table 4 (1,551).
[Insert Table 4 here]
Test of Spillover Effects on Day 30
It is possible that information from the flood of Call Reports that are released on day 30 spills over to the banks that do not file on day 30. To test for spillover effects, we confine the sample to banks that did not release their Call Report on day 30, and re-estimate regression (1) when including an explanatory variable that equals 1 on day 30 and 0 otherwise. In un-tabulated results, we find that the estimated coefficient on this variable is not statistically different from zero in the RET or VOL regression, providing no evidence of a day 30 spillover effect. We do, however, find that the CALL variable has a significantly positive coefficient, indicating that the banks that do not file on day 30 exhibit abnormal market activity on their actual Call Report filing days. Contrary to expectation, the estimated coefficients on the CALL2 interactions are significantly negative for both complexity proxies (p < .01), indicating that more complex banks tend to have less price reaction to their Call Reports released after earnings announcements. As discussed earlier, the two complexity proxies are highly correlated with bank size, meaning that the negative interaction effect may be driven by bank size rather than complexity. In untabulated analysis, we re-estimate the specifications in columns 2 and 3 after including interactions involving bank size.
Regression-based Tests of Variation in Market Reaction
The estimated coefficients on the interactions between CALL2 and each complexity proxy become statistically indistinguishable from zero, but the coefficient estimates exhibit high variance inflation factors. Thus, due to multicollinearity, the effects of bank complexity cannot be empirically distinguished from the effects of bank size.
The fourth and fifth columns of Panels A and B provide no evidence that price reaction varies with low capital (LOW_CR) or asset/liability maturity gap (LTGAP). The final column of Panel A indicates that the reaction to Call Reports tend to be lower when the bank's earnings announcement contains more information, as proxied by the number of words (EA_WORDS) in the earnings announcement. However, EA_WORDS is highly correlated with bank size, and the estimated coefficient on the EA_WORDS interaction is not statistically significant after including the bank size interaction in the model.
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[Insert Table 5 here]
Blind Approximation of Market Reaction to Call Reports
Because a historical record of the public release dates of Call Reports is not publicly available, we investigate how closely the market reaction to Call Reports can be approximated without having access to the actual release dates. Given our finding that more than half of all Call
Reports are reported on day 30, we create an approximation of the CALL variable, called A_CALL, 16 We do not interact CALL1 with EA_WORDS because there is unlikely to be a causal relation between the market reaction to a Call Report and the number of words in a subsequent earnings announcement.
that equals 1 on "day 30" of the quarter for all banks regardless of their actual Call Report filing date. Table 6 contains the results from estimating regression (6). The estimated coefficients on A_CALL in Table 6 and CALL in Table 4 have similar magnitudes. In the RET regressions, the magnitude of the A_CALL coefficient indicates that mean price volatility is 22 percent higher than the non-event day mean (significant at the 10 percent level). The corresponding quantity for the CALL coefficient in Table 4 is 18 percent (significant at the 5 percent level). The magnitudes of the two coefficients are not statistically different from each other. When sequencing is considered, inferences based on approximated dates differ somewhat from inferences based on actual dates.
The magnitude of the A_CALL1 coefficient in the RET regression indicates that mean price volatility increases by 9 percent on approximated Call Report filing dates that precede the earnings announcements. However, the coefficient t-statistic of 0.61 is far from conventional significance thresholds. In contrast, the CALL1 coefficient in Table 4 has a similar magnitude, but is statistically significant (t-statistic of 1.75).
Unlike the A_CALL1 approximation, the A_CALL2 approximation produces results similar to those obtained using actual release dates. The magnitude of the A_CALL2 coefficient indicates that mean price volatility increases by 24 percent on approximated Call Report dates that follow earnings announcements, with a t-statistic of 1.35. The corresponding quantities for the CALL2 coefficient in Table 4 are 19 percent and 1.63. The magnitudes of the two coefficients do not statistically differ from each other. Thus, it appears that assumed day 30 release dates can be used effectively to approximate market reactions to Call Reports when earnings are announced prior to day 30, but not when earnings are announced after day 30. Results using the volume-based measure of market reaction around day 30 are similar across approximated and actual release dates.
[Insert Table 6 here]
How Long has Abnormal Market Activity Occurred on "Day 30" in the Banking Industry?
Our final analysis examines how long and how consistently "day 30" of the quarter has been characterized by heightened market activity in the banking industry. We expand the sample period to the years 2000 to 2013 and include all publicly traded BHCs that have the daily CRSP data necessary for constructing test variables. 17 We use this sample to estimate regression (7) by calendar year. The estimated coefficient on A_CALL reflects the extent to which there is abnormal price volatility or volume on the four "day 30s" that occur in a given year. Table 7 [Insert Table 7 here]
VI. CONCLUSION
Each quarter, banks' Call Reports and Y-9Cs are publicly released in the same general time frame as earnings announcements and SEC filings. Because the core of the bank regulatory reports is a set of GAAP-based financial statements, the reports overlap with information in earnings announcements and SEC filings. The bank regulatory reports tend to contain more information about particular operating activities such as mortgage lending and securitizations, but lack footnotes and other qualitative disclosures. We investigate the role of these reports in banks' information environments.
By tracking the release of each report from January 1, 2012 to March 31, 2014, we find that the majority of Call Reports become public on "day 30," defined as the 30th calendar day after quarter end or the next business day if the 30 th calendar day falls on a weekend or holiday. During the sample period, we find that 92 percent of Call Reports are released 27 to 31 days after quarter end, with 56 percent released on day 30. Y-9Cs are released between days 36 to 49 after quarter end, peaking at day 45 (40) following fourth (interim) quarters. These timing patterns mean that Call Reports are usually released after earnings announcements. Y-9Cs almost always follow Call
Reports and earnings announcements, and sometimes follow 10-K/Qs.
We find that Call Reports elicit statistically significant stock price and volume reactions when they are publicly released. In contrast, Y-9Cs do not, likely because their information content is preempted by earlier filings. Call Reports tend to elicit significant market reactions even when they follow earnings announcements. When the Call Report follows (precedes) the earnings announcement, mean price volatility around the report release date is 19 (12) percent higher than the non-event day mean. Call Reports also appear to preempt some of the information in earnings announcements; when a Call Report precedes an earnings announcement, mean price volatility around earnings announcements is 32 percent lower.
The clustering of Call Reports around day 30, and the resulting market reaction, have implications for practice, regulation, and future research. The large amount of information about banks that is released around day 30 is relevant to portfolio allocation decisions concerning exposure to individual bank stocks and exposure to the industry as a whole. The information becomes available in a standardized format well before 10-Ks and 10-Qs are available, and sometimes before earnings are announced. The predictable increase in industry-level volatility around day 30 may also be relevant to investment strategies that are sensitive to volatility, such as option straddles.
Relevant for banking regulation, the findings imply that bank stock prices respond to reports that bank regulators have designed for supervisory purposes, which supports the notion that equity market values could be a useful signal for regulatory supervision (Furlong and Williams 2006; Curry et al. 2003) . However, the timing of report releases does not appear to be widely known by market participants. Publicizing the report releases may cause more information to be impounded into stock prices more quickly. LTGAP = the absolute difference between long term earning assets, excluding securities, and long term financial liabilities, scaled by market value of equity (CSHPRQ*PRCCQ from Compustat). Long term earning assets excluding securities are computed as bhck0395+bhck0397+bhck1754+bhck1773+bhdmb987+bhckb989+ bhckb528-bhck5526-bhck3197-bhck0384-bhck0387-bhcka511. Long term financial liabilities are computed as bhdm6636+bhfn6636 +bhck3190+bhck4062+bhckc699-bhck3296-bhck3298-bhck3409.
RET = firm i's market-adjusted stock return over days 0 and 1. We use value-weighted returns (VWRETD) to market-adjust. The return metric is computed as follows:
, where the numerator is the cumulative squared market-adjusted return over days 0 and 1 and the denominator is the mean of this same measure during the last month of the previous quarter. VOL = firm i's market-adjusted volume over days 0 and 1. Following Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006) , the volume metric is computed as follows:
is firm i's (CRSP universe) trading volume on day t, and Shsit (ShsMt) is firm i's (CRSP universe) shares outstanding on day t. The first part of the metric sums firm i's share turnover (Vit / Shsit) over days t and t+1 and adjusts the firm's share turnover for the share turnover of the market on those same days. The second part of the metric adjusts this market-adjusted turnover metric for the firm's average level of market-adjusted turnover during the last month of the previous quarter. An F-test indicates that the estimate of the coefficient on EA1 is statistically different from the estimate of the coefficient on EA2 in the second and fourth regression (one-tailed p = 0.001, 0.001, respectively). An F-test indicates that the estimate of the coefficient on CALL1 is not statistically different from the estimate of the coefficient on CALL2 in the second and fourth regression (one-tailed p = 0.636, 0.129, respectively). 
